Analyst of Iranian politics based in the US
Iran’s president Masoud Pezeshkian had all his cabinet approved by the country’s parliament with no hiccups. He had the Supreme Leader's blessing for every name on his team. But will this blessed cabinet be able to oversee a shift in foreign policy and revive the nuclear deal?
Abbas Araghchi, the new foreign minister approved by Khamenei, was one of the original negotiators in the Iran deal talks. He has chosen as his deputy another member of that negotiating team, Majid Takht-Ravanchi. Both men possess the experience and skills to resolve technical issues related to a potential deal. The problem is that their loyalty to the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) is absolute. They believe in the 'principles' of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, chief among them, focus on the Axis of Resistance.
Araghchi, compared to Javad Zarif, has fewer differences with hardliners and stands somewhere between Zarif and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran’s former foreign minister who was killed along with President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash. So far, Araghchi’s public statements have been in line with the agenda set out by Pezeshkian in an open letter he wrote shortly after his election. There is very little to separate this new agenda and that of Raisi’s, apart from a softer tone.
Pezeshkian did speak about the need for sanctions removal and the normalization of relations with the world during his campaign. Since assuming office, however, he has shifted toward blaming the US for imposing "unjust sanctions" and defending the expansion of strategic ties with Russia and China. This shift negatively impacts his administration’s ability to open a new chapter in the longstanding conflict. The biggest obstacle is, of course, Khamenei, who determines foreign policy. Without a change in his stance, it’s difficult to see a different outcome from the failure of the two previous administrations to revive the Iran deal.
Although Araghchi has retreated from his initial stance on the irrelevance of the JCPOA and the need for a new agreement, this shift reveals a stark reality: the JCPOA, due to the broken commitments of both the US and Iran, no longer exists—it is effectively dead. According to the most recent report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has added cascades of centrifuges at its main uranium enrichment sites in Natanz and Fordow. Even the IAEA chief has suggested that the JCPOA may have expired.
Iran has significantly reduced the breakout time to just a few months by gradually advancing its uranium enrichment levels and increasing its stockpile over the past six years. It now claims the capability to make atomic bombs, though Khamenei's religious order (Fatwa) supposedly prevents them from doing so. However, it seems their ultimate goal is to use their advanced nuclear program as leverage to pressure the US and EU into reviving the JCPOA or forging a new agreement without substantial changes or additional demands.
Any agreement would be a tall order since the conditions now are far less favorable than 2015, when the nuclear deal was announced. The areas of conflict have expanded after the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Now, a stronger deal is needed to mitigate instability in the region and the world. And Iran is known to be quite hostile to any suggestion of additional demands.
It is worth noting that the Biden administration initially pushed for a new JCPOA. Iranian leaders may not be opposed to the idea in principle, but the gap between the two sides seems too big to bridge. Iran under Pezeshkian will continue its support for armed groups in the region while managing the scope and scale of its tensions with US and Israel. This policy is inherently problematic and may be unsustainable. At best, it could lead to a temporary reduction in tensions.
The Biden administration has so far shown little enthusiasm for engaging with Iran’s new administration. The upcoming US election could be the main reason for both sides’ caution. A Trump victory would likely complicate Pezeshkian’s position. It could mean further escalation of tensions even. It’s not impossible that Trump may seek a stronger deal eventually, humiliating Iran along the way. A Kamala Harris win would therefore look like the more favorable outcome for Iran. But the fundamental issues and obstacles will persist whoever the president.
Another factor complicating the potential for a new agreement is the growing military cooperation between Iran and Russia. If Iran sends Russia ballistic missiles, as reported recently, tensions could reach new heights, given NATO's repeated warnings to Iran. It’s not impossible that Germany, Britain, and France would seek snapback sanctions—a provision in the JCPOA to reimpose suspended UN resolutions against Iran and essentially dismantle the JCPOA. That would be catastrophic for Pezeshkian who taunted his hardline rival for ruining the chances of a JCPOA revival.
An optimistic scenario hinges on new calculations within Khamenei’s court, which could lead to renewed negotiations with the US over the nuclear issue and ultimately result in a new agreement with controlled setbacks—yet another Heroic Flexibility, as Khamenei named his previous retreat. This scenario could be complicated too. China’s purchase of Iranian oil at reduced prices has weakened US leverage and the effectiveness of sanctions. Europe, on the other hand, wants to contain Russia and manage the oil market, which might require offering concessions to Iran to reduce its military aid to Russia.
It is too early to predict where Iran is headed under Pezeshkian. It can be said with some confidence, however, that a strategic change in Iran’s foreign policy is unlikely. Any change would most likely be tactical or symbolic. A scenario somewhere between the two outlined here could also emerge, potentially allowing for an interim agreement that initially breaks the current deadlock by having the US lift some sanctions in exchange for Iran halting some of its nuclear activities that violate the JCPOA framework.
For now, due to increased tensions amid the Gaza war, confrontation continues, with the US enforcing and expanding unilateral sanctions while Iranian proxies attack American military and diplomatic centers in Iraq. Barring a near miraculous turn of events, there will be no easing of tensions in the months to come.
